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FOREIGN INVESTORS AND THE COLOMBIAN PEACE PROCESS  
Andrei Gomez-Suarez*, Nicolás M. Perrone**, Enrique Prieto Ríos*** 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The International Investment Regime (IIR) materialises in international arbitral 
tribunals that protect the rights of foreign investors. ¿Could these tribunals 
hamper the implementation of exceptional measures agreed to end armed 
conflicts? The principle of proportionality, usually employed to balance competing 
demands such as the interests of international investors and the right of states to 
self-determination, could fall short when it comes to the concept of a nation and a 
society’s right to peace. Focusing on the Colombian peace process, this article 
argues that the agreement on land redistribution, a cornerstone of the peace 
agreements, benefits the whole society, including foreign investors. However, the 
colonialist nature of the IIR could lead foreign investors, who see their 
investments and expected profits affected, to demand compensation for 
governmental land acquisition. The transition from war to peace in Colombia will 
be played out in these kinds of legal battles, and only the determination of the 
government to stand for Colombians’ right to peace will ensure that international 
investors do not became an obstacle for sustainable peace. The Colombian case 
suggests powerful lessons for the willingness of transitional states to defend their 
people’s right to peace in international tribunals. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the beginning of the peace process between the President of Colombia Juan 
Manuel Santos (2010-2018) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-
People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia FARC-EP), the 
optimism amongst the international community has been on the rise. The United 
Nations Security Council Resolution in January 2016 creating a political mission to 
verify a bilateral ceasefire,1 the participation of five delegations of victims who 
contributed to the agreement on the creation of a Comprehensive System of Truth, 
Justice, Reparations and Non-Repetition reached in December 2015, the 
implementation of a demining programme which began in July 2015, the report of 
the Historic Commission of the Conflict and its Victims released in February 2015, 
are all achievements which have served to counter the scepticism from different 
                                                 
* Andrei Gomez-Suarez is Lecturer on Transitional Justice at the University of Los Andes, research 
associate at the Centre for Criminology at the University of Oxford and member of the Sussex 
Centre for Conflict and Security Research at the University of Sussex. Email: ag210@sussex.ac.uk. 
** Nicolás Marcelo Perrone is an Assistant Professor at the Universidad Externado de Colombia. 
PhD, London School of Economics and Political Science. Email: nicolas.perrone@uexternado.edu.co. 
*** Enrique Prieto-Rios is a Visiting Lecturer at Universidad de los Andes- School of Law and PhD 
Candidate at Birkbeck University of London – School of Law. Email: ea.prieto@uniandes.edu.co. 
1 United Nations Security Council (2016), see: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID 
=53091#.VriUdfkrLnA (retrieved 9 February 2016). 
Forthcoming, 18:3 International Community Law Review 
2 
 
sectors that worried that the final peace agreement would be a blank check for 
impunity.2 
 
Colombian public opinion’s outlook is also changing. Although the 2014 
presidential race showed that a large number of Colombians opposed the Santos-
FARC peace talks, a broad alliance between leftist parties and President Santos’ 
National Unity political platform (which includes the Liberal and Conservative 
parties, among others) helped him to achieve victory, demonstrating that most 
Colombians finally turned in favour of his peace policy.3 Moreover, President 
Santos’ inauguration speech suggested that his second term in office was to be 
dedicated to convincing Colombians that the time for peace has come.4 This was 
never going to be an easy task, but a clever media strategy has enabled Santos to 
present the achievements of the negotiations thus far as evidence that what the 
parties are agreeing are the minimum agreements necessary for the 
modernisation of Colombia. The agreements reached so far are: (1) a 
comprehensive agrarian development policy, (2) political participation, (3) 
combating illicit drugs, and (4) a comprehensive transitional justice mechanism. 
 
The agreement on political participation,5 the second point of the agenda, seeks to 
transform Colombia’s democracy. It does not only envisage political guarantees for 
opposition parties but also, after the first failed attempt of demobilising and 
reintegrating FARC in the 1980s,6 it establishes the creation of a Comprehensive 
Security Mechanism to avoid spirals of violence against demobilised FARC 
members who go into politics.7 The visits of Army General Javier Florez and four 
other Generals of the Colombian Armed Forces to the negotiation table to discuss 
the mechanism for a bilateral ceasefire suggests that an important sector of the 
military is willing to offer protection to those who decide to give up their 
weapons.8 However, inside spoilers within the army continue to pose a challenge 
to the peace process, in particular because of the political support they receive 
from former president Alvaro Uribe’s Democratic Centre (Centro Democrático) 
Party.9 
                                                 
2In a recent visit to Colombia, Professor Claus Kress said that the Colombian peace process had 
convinced many key actors of the international community, see: http://www.semana.com/ 
nacion/articulo/la-paz-en-colombia-tendra-repercusiones-en-todo-el-mundo/400100-3 
(retrieved 25 Aug 2014). 
3 For an analysis of the presidential race see: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/ 
2014/06/colombia-runoff-elections-2014612112739436880.html (retrieved 25 August 2014). 
4 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/08/santos-2014-2018-new-beginning-2014 
810202423843968 .html (retrieved 25 August 2014). 
5 The agreement on political participation can be read at: https://www.mesadeconversaciones. 
com.co/sites/default/files/Borrador%20Conjunto%20-%20Participaci_n%20Pol_tica.pdf 
(retrieved 9 February 2016) 
6 Andrei Gomez-Suarez Genocide, Geopolitics and Transnational Networks (2015) 
7 Andrei Gomez-Suarez and Jonathan Newman, "Safeguarding political guarantees in the Colombian 
peace process: Have Santos and FARC learned the lessons from the past?", 35:4 Third World 
Quarterly (2013), p. 819. 
8 See: http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/cinco-generales-viajaran-la-habana-reunirse-con-
las-farc/419596-3  (retrieved 24 March 2015).  
9 Hacker Andres Sepulveda’s recent statements show the links between sectors of the army and the 
Centro Democratico Party in a campaign against the peace process, see: 
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The agreement on combating illicit drugs is another element which demonstrates 
that the parties are seeking to establish the basic elements to bring a long-lasting 
peace to Colombia.10 It not only aims to tackle drug trafficking, the fuel that 
maintains the conflict, but also to put an end to the corruption of financial 
networks and legal institutions by state officials and criminals who benefit from 
the conflict. The Comprehensive Substitution of Illegal Crops Programme, the 
Comprehensive Strategy against Corruption (which contains a strategy to combat 
money laundering), and the promotion of an international conference to discuss 
the global ‘war on drugs’, are all substantive elements of the agreement. The 
implementation of these programmes and strategies will be a serious challenge for 
a long-lasting peace in Colombia. 
 
The agreement on transitional justice seeks to dismantle the culture of impunity in 
Colombia.11 The parties agreed on the basic foundations for the creation of a 
comprehensive system that will include: (1) a Truth Commission, with national 
and international commissioners; (2) a Special Jurisdiction for Peace, made up of 
twenty-four magistrates to ensure the investigation, prosecution and sentencing 
of those most responsible for the gravest crimes; (3) the strengthening of the 
reparations scheme put in place by the Land Restitution and Victims’ Law (Law 
1448 of 2011); and (4) early acts of recognition of wrongdoings by the parties as 
part of the guarantees of non-repetition.12 
 
Despite the importance of each of the above mentioned agreements, this article 
will focus on the challenges of implementing the first point of the agenda, which 
establishes the mechanisms to bring about a Comprehensive Agrarian 
Development Policy (CADP), for the rural areas in Colombia.13 The issue of land 
has been at the heart of the conflict since its inception.14 FARC was created as a 
reaction to the military attack of Marquetalia, which was a plot of land in which 
displaced families had settled as a result of the violent dispossession of land and 
the expulsion of peasants produced by the period of civil war known as La 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/el-ventilador-del-hacker/400101-3 (retrieved 25 
August 2014). 
10 The agreement to combat illicit drugs can be found at: https://www.mesadeconversaciones. 
com.co/sites/default/files/Borrador%20Conjunto%20-%20Soluci_n%20al%20problema%20 
de%20las%20drogas%20il_citas.pdf (retrieved 9 February 2016). 
11 The agreement on transitional justice is available at: https://www.mesadeconversaciones.com. 
co/sites/default/files/comunicado-conjunto-60-ingles-1443452175.pdf (retrieved 9 February 
2016) 
12 See Andrei Gomez-Suarez “Logros del Proceso de Paz y Retos para la Sociedad Civil: una con-
textualización de la negociación entre el gobierno Santos y las FARC” en O. Gomez Paz, Víctimas y 
Posconflicto (2016). 
13 The agreement can be accessed in: https://www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co/sites/default/ 
files/Borrador%20Conjunto%20-%20%20Pol_tica%20de%20desarrollo%20agrario%20integral 
.pdf (retrieved 9 February 2016). 
14 Alejandro Reyes, Guerreros y Campesinos (2009). See also Reyes’ blog for recent entries on 
developments in the Colombian peace process and the land issue: 
http://alejandroreyesposada.wordpress.com/ (retrieved 25 August 2014). 
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Violencia.15 The CADP, as we will see below, is not only necessary to end of the 
armed conflict by getting to its source, but also to improve the countryside, which 
in most of Colombia could be said to resemble a feudal system. 
 
The centrality of the CADP for reaching peace in Colombia poses the question, to 
what extent might those who hold rights to property in the countryside oppose 
peace, either by resisting the termination of their property rights, or by 
demanding burdensome compensations? To answer this, we must analyse the 
relative strength of these property rights vis-à-vis the right of the Colombian 
society to peace. Strong private property rights can threaten the society and any 
space for imagination and reform. In the context of today’s Colombia, strong 
property rights could constitute an obstacle to social peace by fuelling conflict 
about land, and by blocking any potential deal to reach peace among Colombians. 
 
While currently most analyses look at the internal challenges to the CADP, 
including domestic property rights,16 we explore the challenges posed by 
international factors, more specifically, by foreign investor rights.17 As Colombia’s 
internal processes are determined by the international system of which it is part, 
this article unveils the limits that the international investment regime (IIR) could 
pose in bringing about a redistribution of land in a post-conflict Colombia. It first 
discusses the developments of the IIR and the impact in Colombia before the 
Santos-FARC peace talks. It explores the content of the agreement on a CADP. The 
final part outlines the challenges of the implementation of the CADP in the 
framework of the IIR of which Colombia is part. 
 
1. THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME 
 
a. The structure and features of the IIR 
The IIR comprises a set of instruments and institutions for the promotion and 
protection of foreign investments worldwide. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that contain investment chapters, and any other 
international treaties with similar aims and characteristics are among the most 
important instruments of the regime. The treaties’ aim is to establish the rules 
between two or more states with regard to the treatment and protection offered 
to foreign investors of States’ parties within the territory of the other party, and 
the establishment of investor-state arbitration to resolve disputes. These disputes 
can be resolved by either an ad-hoc tribunal or an institutional arbitral tribunal. 
Ad-hoc tribunals act independently of any international institution and depend 
entirely upon the regulations agreed by the parties. Institutional tribunals, on the 
other hand, are linked to organisations that specialise in arbitral procedures. The 
                                                 
15 Maria Saffon, "The Project of Land Restitution in Colombia: An Illustration of the Civilizing force 
of Hypocrisy?", 12:2 Revista de Estudios Socio-Juridicos (2010), p. 119. La Violencia is the civil war 
between the Liberal and Conservative Parties in Colombia, which lasted between 1948 and 1965. 
16 Juan David Gutierrez-Rodriguez “Investing for peace? On the use of resource revenues to finance 
an eventual post-conflict process in Colombia” 6:1 Revista Análisis Internacional (2015), p.221 
17 See Nicolás Perrone, "The International Investment Regime and Foreign Investors’ Rights: 
Another view of a popular story", 11:3 Manchester Journal of International Economic Law (2014), 
pp. 397-420. 
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most important is the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), which is part of the World Bank.18 
 
The terms in investment treaties tend to be broad and vague. Some examples 
include the meaning and extent of what constitutes a violation of the right to a fair 
and equitable treatment by the host state, the scope of indirect expropriation, or 
what could be understood as an investment. Thus, any legal, judicial or 
administrative decision adopted by the host government could be regarded as 
affecting foreign investor rights and the standards of protection included in the 
treaties. The treaties do not generally include obligations for the foreign investor 
to do with things such as protection of the environment, compliance with human 
rights obligations, the transference of know-how, or the promotion of economic 
growth. 
 
The IIR seeks to protect foreign investors against the possible wrongful acts of 
host sates. This results in an unbalanced instrument in favour of transnational 
corporations (TNCs) — which in the majority of cases come from capital-exporting 
states — that have rights but no correlative duties or responsibilities. 
 
Colombia has followed the same patterns of other capital-importing countries 
signing international investment treaties with the aim of attracting more foreign 
investors in order to reach their development goals.19 Looking at the criticisms 
against the IIR, it is likely that Colombia, like other capital importer countries that 
have suffered the same fate,20 will see its ability to resolve internal matters of 
public interest curtailed by the threat of being sued by foreign investors before 
international arbitral tribunals or by the decisions adopted by such tribunals. 
 
b. The Post-colonial origins of IIR and further historical development 
The current IIR emerged as an international legal response to the processes of 
decolonisation in order to protect the economic interests of Western investors in 
the newly decolonised countries.21 The regime is a product of colonialism and 
imperialism, which began in the seventeenth century and ‘formally’ lasted until 
the twentieth century.22 It is not possible to separate the IIR from its socio-
political historical origins, which continue to shape its current realities.  
 
European conceptions of property, rights and economy formed the essential basis 
for the current IIR.23 It was not until the 1990s, however, that the IIR came to the 
fore as a result of different factors, including the influence of the World Bank and 
                                                 
18 Jeswald Salacuse, "The Emerging Global Regime for Investment," 51 Harvard International Law 
Journal (2010), p. 429. 
19 Jeswald Salacuse and Nicholas Sullivan, "Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain", 46 Harvard  International Law Journal  (2005), p. 
67. 
20 There are several well known cases including cases of Argentina, Ecuador, Greece and others 
explained later in this document. 
21 Jeswald Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (2010), p. 83. 
22 Kate Miles, "International Investment Law: Origins, Imperialism and Conceptualizing the 
Environment", 21 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy (2010), p. 1. 
23 Ibid.  
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the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on ‘Third-World’ countries. The IIR has 
ever since been portrayed as a suitable instrument to attract foreign investment, 
and promote economic growth and development.24  
 
With the end of World War II and with the more evident weakening of the global 
colonial project, decolonisation movements in Africa and Asia gained in strength 
and popularity (especially during the 1950s and 60s). Facing this reality, North 
America and Western Europe began to be persuaded that the best option for 
continuing control of colonial territories and avoiding communist subversion was 
to allow the claims to the right of self-determination.25 However, the 
independence of the countries posed a challenge to Western economic interests, 
especially regarding access to raw materials and the protection of investments 
made in such territories. 
 
Western colonial powers responded to the decolonisation process by pursuing an 
institutional shift in the structure of international politics and international law. 
This shift consisted of rearranging the international structure so as to guarantee 
that while claims of self-determination were fulfilled, the new independent 
countries would be locked within a Western political, economic and legal 
framework,26 protecting Western economic interests.27 It is within this shift and 
context that the current IIR started to take form as a clear application of 
imperialist policies.  
 
Capital-exporting states argued that there were well-established rules of 
international law binding new states to comply with obligations acquired prior to 
their independence. The logic is that the former colonies had to adhere to rules 
already in place; accordingly, if expropriation was pursued by the new 
independent countries, the new decolonised countries would have to pay full 
compensation in accordance with rules of international law.28  
 
In this way, the whole structure of the IIR was constructed on the need to protect 
foreign investors against the possible actions of ‘backwards’ societies (‘the other’) 
that were gaining independence and that did not give so much importance to the 
rights of property. In this regard, Fanon states:  
 
Now the scapegoat for white society — which is based on myths of progress, 
civilization, liberalism, education, enlighten, refinement — will be precisely 
the force that opposes the expansion and triumph of these myths. This brutal 
opposing force is supplied by the negro.29 
                                                 
24 See Tagi Sagafi-nejad and John Dunning, The UN and Transnational Corporations: From code of 
conduct to global compact (2008), pp. 138-40. 
25 Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics 
of Universality (2011.), p. 45. 
26 Ibid.. 
27 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "Between Prospero and Caliban: Colonialism, Postcolonialism, and 
Inter-Identity", in M. Morana and C. Jauregui (eds.), Revisiting the Colonial Question in Latin America 
(2008), p. 144. 
28 See Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (2004). 
29 Frantz,Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (1986 [1952]), p. 194.,  
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The evolution of the IIR took different directions on either side of the Atlantic. In 
the United States, a new program launched in 1946 on treaties of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation (FCN) focused on the protection of Investments 
abroad.30 From 1946 to 1966, the United States concluded 35 new FCN 
agreements.31 Parallel to this, Western European countries began to launch their 
own program for the protection of their investments in the new independent 
countries. The first Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) was signed in 1959 between 
Pakistan and Germany, three years after the transformation of Pakistan into a 
Islamic democratic republic.32 The treaty aimed to protect the property of German 
nationals against any direct expropriation that might be adopted by the 
Government of Pakistan.33 France concluded its first BIT in 1960, Switzerland in 
1961, the Netherlands in 1963, Norway in 1966 and the United Kingdom in 
1975.34  
 
In the 1990s, IIR reached its full potential; the figures show that the number of 
BITs signed during the 1990s increased from 385 to 1857,35 compared to 386 
agreements signed between 1959 and 1989.36 Different factors contributed in the 
success of BITs during the 1980s and 1990s. They include the end of the gold 
parity in the 1970s,37 the debt crisis in Latin America in the 1980s, the reduction 
in the contribution of the USA to multilateral development banks,38 the heavy 
economic and technological dependence of foreign investments by third world 
countries, the lack of trust of foreign investors in local governments and courts, 
and the fall of the Soviet Union. The latter was perceived as the ‘end of the history’ 
and countries had no other option but to surrender to the impositions of the post-
colonial capitalist market. According to the IMF and World Bank, foreign 
investment was an essential requirement for modernisation, economic growth and 
development.39 Thus, third world countries had to focus on making themselves 
more attractive to foreign investors with internal reforms and signing treaties 
which, according to the recipe, would end up attracting huge flows of investment 
to the country. 40  
 
                                                 
30 Kenneth Vandevelde,  "A Brief History Of International Investment Agreements", 12 U.C. Davis 
Journal of International Law & Policy (2005), p. 157. 
31 With the entry into force in 1948 of The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)  to 
regulate trade and commerce among countries, the old FCN treaties began to diminish in 
importance. 
32 Story of Pakistan, The Constitution of 1956, http://storyofpakistan.com/the-constitution-of-1956 
(retreived 03 February 2016). 
33 Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Pakistan - Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Signed 25 November 1959).  
34 Kenneth Vandevelde, above n 30. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid. 
37 Asha Kaushal,  "Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the 
Foreign Investment Regime", 50 Harvard International Law Journal  (2009), p. 491. 
38 Kenneth Vandevelde, above n 30. 
39 Gilbert Rist, The History of Development. From Western Origins to Global Faith (2006), p. 113. 
40 Margot Salomon,  "Winners and others: accounting for international law’s favourites", in C. 
Gearty and C. Douzinas (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Human Rights Law (2012), p. 281. 
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c. Colombia and the IIR 
 
By 2013, the network of BITs signed reached 3240 worldwide, and Colombia is 
participating in the global share.41 In the 1990s, Colombia started a program of 
negotiating BITs for the protection of foreign investments in Colombia.42 This 
program started under the Government of President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo, with 
the support of the then Minister of Foreign Trade Juan Manuel Santos Calderon 
(current President of Colombia). By 1998, Colombia had negotiated and signed 
BITs with the United Kingdom (1995), Cuba (1995), Peru (1996) and Spain 
(1997). These BITs were declared by the Colombian Constitutional Court as 
partially not in accordance with the Colombian Constitution of 1991.43 According 
to the ruling, the requirement of compensation described in the BITs was at the 
time different to the requirement of compensation described in article 58 of the 
Colombian Constitution, which allowed the Colombian Congress under certain 
circumstances to expropriate without payment of compensation.44 
 
Due to the fact that the Constitution was undermining Colombian efforts to 
become more attractive to foreign investors, the government pursued a 
constitutional reform in 1999 removing the faculty of Congress to expropriate 
without the payment of compensation. Article 58 of the Colombian Constitution 
was amended in accordance with the BIT’s requirement of payment of 
compensation in all expropriations.45 After the constitutional amendment was 
effective, Colombia continued its policy to create a pro-investor environment 
signing various BITs with different countries. The following is the list of BITs 
signed, ratified and in force in Colombia:46 
 
Country Date 
entering 
into force. 
Law  Decision of 
Constitutional 
Review by the 
Constitutional 
Court. 
BIT with Chile 2001 2002 Act 672 of 2001 C-294 of 2002 
BIT with Spain 2006 2007 Act 1096 of 2006 C-309 of 2007 
BIT with Switzerland 2008 2009 Act 1198 of 2008 C-150 of 2009 
BIT with Peru 2009  2010 Act 1342 of 2009 C-377 of 2010 
BIT with India 2012 Act 1449 of 2011 C-123 of 2012 
                                                 
41 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), ‘World Investment Report’ 
2014 xxiii <http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2014_en.pdf> (retrieved 19 March 
2015). 
42 Enrique Prieto Ríos, "BITs y la Constitución de 1991: Internacionalización de la Economía dentro 
de un Estado Social de Derecho", 13: 1  Estudios Socio Jurídicos  (2011), p. 109. 
43 See Decisions of Constitutional Review by the  Colombian Constitutional Court: C-358 of 1996, C-
379 of 1996, C-008 of 1997. 
44 Article 58: Con todo, el legislador, por razones de equidad, podrá determinar los casos en que no 
haya lugar al pago de indemnización, mediante el voto favorable de la mayoría absoluta de los 
miembros de una y otra cámara. Las razones de equidad, así como los motivos de utilidad pública o 
de interés social, invocados por el legislador, no serán controvertibles judicialmente.’ 
45 Legislative Act  01 of 1999 (Acto Legislativo) (Colombia) 
46 Procolombia, ‘Colombia y los Acuerdos Internacionales de Inversión,’ http://www.colombia 
invierte.com.co/aspectos-legales/colombia-y-los-acuerdos-internacionales-de-inversion> 
(retrieved 18 March 2015). 
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BIT with China 2011 2012 Act 1462 of 2011 C-199 of 2012 
BIT with the United Kingdom 2014 Act 1464 of 2011 C-169 of 2012 
 
The following is the list of BITs that are either under negotiation or are pending 
ratification by Colombia or the other party to the treaty:47 
 
Country Status 
BIT with South Korea Pending approval by the Colombian 
Congress. 
BIT with Kuwait  In negotiation 
BIT with Singapore In negotiation 
BIT with Japan Pending approval by the Colombian 
Congress. 
BIT with Turkey In negotiation 
BIT with Uruguay In negotiation 
BIT with Qatar In negotiation 
BIT with Azerbaijan  In negotiation 
BIT with Russia In negotiation 
BIT with Belgium-Luxemburg Subscribed, pending approval by the 
legislative in both countries. 
BIT with Ecuador In negotiation 
  
The Following are the Foreign Trade Agreements (FTA) ratified and in force in 
Colombia, that contain a chapter for the protection of foreign investments: 
 
Country Date entering into 
force. 
Law Decision of 
Constitutional 
Review by the 
Constitutional 
Court. 
FTA with Mexico 
(Chapter XVII) 
1999, modified in 
2011 
Act 172 of 1994 
and Act 1457 of 
2011 
C-178 of 1995 
C-051 of 2012 
FTA with Chile  
(Chapter IX) 
2009 Act 1189 of 2008 C-031 of 2009 
FTA with the 
Triangle of the 
North  - 
Guatemala, 
Salvador and 
Honduras 
(Chapter XII) 
2010 Act 1241 of 2008 C-446 of 2009 
FTA with the USA 
(Chapter X) 
2012 Act 1143 of 2007 C-751 of 2008 
FTA with Canada 
(Chapter VIII) 
2011 Act 1363 of 2009 C-608 of 2010 
FTA with 2011 Act 1372 of 2010 C-941 of 2010. 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
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Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein 
(Chapter V)  
 
The FTA with the 
European Union 
(E.U.)  
Pending approval 
in the 
parliaments of 
the EU member 
countries 
  
 
2. THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY: A PARTIAL AGREEMENT OF 
THE SANTOS-FARC PEACE TALKS 
Colombia is one of the most unequal countries in terms of land distribution. As 
part of the Government’s efforts to satisfy the rights of the victims of the armed 
conflict, President Santos presented the Land Restitution and Victims’ Law, issued 
by Congress as Law 1448 of 2011. The “Victims’ Law” created three important 
transitional institutions: the National Victims’ Unit, the National Centre for 
Historical Memory (NCHM), and the Land Restitution Unit (LRU). According the 
2013 NCMH Report ¡Basta Ya!, 8.3 million hectares have been appropriated by 
land grabbers, and the National Registry of Victims shows that there are 6.4 
million victims of forced displacement in Colombia;48 the second largest 
humanitarian crisis in the world, after Syria. The LRU is the institution in charge of 
carrying out the legal procedures to give back illegally stolen land and formalise 
land titles to those displaced in the context of the armed conflict after 1991. 
Moreover, the LRU created and maintains the Illegal Land-grab Registry. By 
October 2015, victims had made 56.328 formal claims.49 Despite these 
unprecedented developments, a 2014 Amnesty International Report sent a 
warning call to the Colombian government:  
Sustainable land restitution will not be possible unless the authorities 
acknowledge and address the part played by large-scale economic interests, 
notably the extractive industries, logging, monocultures such as agro-fuels, 
as well as drug trafficking, in contributing to and benefiting from the illegal 
acquisition of land.50 
The unequal distribution of land is one of the root causes of the armed conflict. 
The last failed attempt at an agrarian reform was carried out by President Carlos 
Lleras (1966-1970). It was not until 2011 that the Santos Administration showed 
that it was willing to address the land issue. However, any attempt to solve the 
agrarian issue necessarily means finding a negotiated solution to the armed 
conflict. Contrary to previous negotiations,51 this time the Colombian Government 
                                                 
48 For the National Registry of Victims see: http://rni.unidadvictimas.gov.co/?q=node/107 (30 oct 
2015) 
49 https://www.restituciondetierras.gov.co/web/guest/pdf-transparencia/-/pdf/ 
10184&c364aba6-5722-4101-ba61-c420017b20c7 (retrieved 24 March 2015). 
50 https://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/land_restiution_eng.pdf page 55 (retrieved 
24 march 2015).  
51 For a comprehensive analysis of previous negotiations, see Carlos Medina Gallego, Conflicto 
armada y procesos de paz en Colombia: Memoria casos FARC-EP y ELN (2009). 
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and FARC started the current peace talks with the land issue as the first point on 
the agenda. However, according to an Oxfam report, Transnational Companies’ 
land interests could be one of the main obstacles for the Colombian state to 
implement the partial agreement on the CADP reached in Havana, unless properly 
addressed by the Colombian government.52  
In May 2013, after six months of negotiations, the Colombian Government and 
FARC reached a partial agreement on rural development; the formal agreement 
was made public on 21 June. The negotiation teams took into account over 3000 
proposals that Colombians sent individually and collectively to the negotiation 
table. The negotiation teams also asked the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the Centre for Thought and Monitoring of the National 
University (CTM-NU) to organise a national forum to receive proposals; more than 
1600 people gathered in Bogota between December 17 and 19. In January 2014, 
after reviewing and organising the outputs of more than 20 roundtables, the UNDP 
and the CTM-NU submitted 546 proposals to the negotiation table.53 Additionally, 
experts on Colombia’s land issues were invited to Havana to offer 
recommendations. 
 
According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, the agreement 
reached on the agrarian question seeks to achieve the well-being of the people in 
the countryside (peasant farmers, indigenous and afro-Colombian communities, 
among others), and the integration of peripheral regions with the economic 
centres to close the gap between rural and urban areas. It is important to note that 
the CADP is important not only to end the armed conflict, but also to achieve the 
government’s aim for Colombia to be accepted in the Organisation for Economic 
and Development Cooperation (OECD).  
  
The agreement on a CADP has four pillars. The first pillar is to democratise the use 
of land. The parties agreed the creation of a Land Fund, which will distribute land 
free of charge. “This process will aim to regularise property title rights and 
consequently deconcentrate and promote an equitable land distribution.”54 This 
Fund would be mainly created with lands wrongfully and illegally acquired, 
without affecting small farmers who could benefit from title formalisation 
programs. Underexploited lands, which do not fulfil the ecological and social 
function of private property, would also be part of the Fund. Judicial and 
administrative property procedures, land acquisition, or expropriation with 
compensation for social interest will be used to acquire the lands for the Fund. The 
existing Forestry Reserve Zones (FRZs) will be protected, and in some cases, 
                                                 
52 Oxfam Research Reports, Divide and purchase: how landownership is being concentrated in 
Colombia, September 2013, available at: http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/rr-
divide-and-purchase-land-concentration-colombia-211013-en.pdf (retrieved 1 September 2014). 
53 See http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/desarrollo-agrario-del-foro-mesa-articulo-
395849 (retrieved 30 August 2014). 
54 Primer informe conjunto de la mesa de conversaciones entre el gobierno de la república de 
Colombia y las fuerzas arma das revolucionarias de Colombia-ejercito del pueblo (FARC-EP), La 
Habana 21 June 2014, available at: https://www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co/ 
comunicados/primer-informe-conjunto-de-la-mesa-de-conversaci ones-la-habana-21-de-junio-de-
2013 (retrieved 31 August 2014), p. 7. 
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through community participation, nearby land with agricultural and livestock 
usage will integrated into enlarged FRZs.55 Some lands owned by TNCs or foreign 
investors could become part of the Land Fund if it is found that they were illegally 
appropriated in the past by the person or company that sold the land to the 
TNCs.56 It is important to note, however, that at the time of writing, the parties had 
not reached an agreement on the size of the Land Fund.57 
 
The access to land from the Fund will be complemented with subsidies, credits, 
technical assistance and support to establish successful trading schemes. The state 
will offer small farmers special credits and subsides to help them to buy land, and 
will create a plan to formalise titles for small and medium properties. To ensure 
the protection of such transactions, the government agreed to create an agrarian 
jurisdiction.  
In order to ensure productive use of land, the government will update the national 
land registry and the tax system to make sure that landowners contribute 
according to the size of their property. The last element of the pillar on use of land 
is that the parties agreed to protect the agricultural frontier and environmental 
special zones.58 
The second pillar of the CADP is to establish special development programs which 
focus on reconstructing the regions most affected by the armed conflict. Such 
programs will rely on participatory mechanisms ensuring that by decentralising 
the implementation of the agreement in a short time-span these regions will 
change, making reconciliation possible.59 
The third pillar consists of national plans that will aim at radically reducing 
poverty and eradicating extreme poverty in the countryside. Some of these plans 
will focus on improving infrastructure by building roads, recovering and 
extending irrigation and drainage systems, and by ensuring electricity and 
internet access for whole Colombian population. Other plans will concentrate on 
improving health and education systems, and housing and public services in the 
regions most affected by the armed conflict. Finally, national plans will centre on 
increasing productivity and consolidating the transition from an informal to 
formal labour market in the countryside.60 
The fourth and last pillar is a special system of food security, which is based on 
strengthening local and regional markets and creating strategies against hunger. 
                                                 
55 Ibid., p. 8. 
56 http://www.lafm.com.co/noticias/jorge-enrique-robledo-denuncia-142766. 
57 http://www.las2orillas.co/la-verdad-lo-que-esta-ocurriendo-en-la-mesa-de-la-habana/ 
(retrieved 25 ago 2015). 
58 Ibíd., p. 9. 
59 Sergio Jaramillo, Alto Comisionado para la Paz, Congreso Latinoamericano de Ciencia Política, 
Universidad de los Andes. Bogotá, 16 de Octubre de 2013 available at: 
http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/herramientas/discursos/Documents/Intervencion_
Sergio_Jaramillo_Congreso_de_ciencia_politica_16_de_octubre.pdf (retrieved 1 September 2014). 
60 Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, Entérese del proceso de paz, Junio 2014 available at: 
http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/herramientas/documentos-y-publicaciones 
/Documents/Enterese %20_del_proceso_de_paz_260614_digital.pdf (retrieved 1 September 2014). 
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The four pillars complement and depend on each other. Political analyst Alejandro 
Reyes said, “the agreement on the agrarian issue takes decisions and creates tools 
to substantially impact the structure of land property in Colombia.”61 
Because of the scope of this article, we are concerned with the first pillar of the 
CADP which, as previously mentioned, refers to the distribution of land. However, 
it must be noted that since the parties have not agreed the location(s) and size of 
the Land Fund yet, it is not possible to refer to concrete examples in which the 
dispute between TNCs and the Colombian State is already taking place. Land 
distribution does not depend exclusively on the political willingness of the 
government and the financial support of the international community. Instead, 
foreign investors (TNCs) are key actors that could reshape the Land Fund, 
represent delay or halt the full implementation of land distribution as their 
economic interest could be affected and the IIR (of which Colombia is part of) is in 
place to protect such interests.  
A current issue that exemplifies the concern regarding the implementation of the 
agreement is related to the Rural Areas of Interest of Economic and Social 
Development (RAIES). RAIES is a governmental initiative that aims at bringing 
together the interest of peasant farmers (small landowners) and the interests of 
agrobusiness. The RAIES were the result of a growing issue regarding land titles. 
The RAIES have been heavily criticised. NGOs such as OXFAM and the Colombian 
Commission of Jurists, argued that instead of giving back the land to peasant 
farmers who were originally displaced by the armed conflict, the RAIES would give 
the land to Agrobusinesses.62 Allocating lands to foreign investors under the 
RAIES scheme raises a serious question: ¿what will happen if these lands are later 
part of the Land Fund? This would affect the investments and expected profits of 
TNCs. In that scenario, the foreign investor could challenge any measure before an 
international arbitral tribunal. The next section outlines the possible outcome of 
international legal disputes associated with the implementation of the CADP in 
Colombia. 
3. LAW, PEACE AND FOREIGN INVESTOR RIGHTS 
 
a. Law and the struggle for peace 
 
Law is a site of social struggle where opposing values clash, and some interests 
eventually prevail over others. In Colombia, law is today a site of the struggle for 
peace. The legal order is fundamental in the peace process, not only for the 
criminal responsibility of many Colombians but also because of the economic 
implications of the armed conflict. Put simply, law shapes the kind of peace that is 
                                                 
61 http://alejandroreyesposada.wordpress.com/2013/06/21/impacto-potencial-del-acuerdo-
agrario-sobre-la-estruc tura-de-propiedad-de-la-tierra/(retrieved 1 September 2014). 
62 Fort he statement of the Colombian Commission of Jurists see: http://www.coljuristas.org/ 
documentos/adicionales/acaparamiento_baldios.pdf (retrieved 9 February 2016) and for Oxfam 
criticisms: https://www.oxfam.org/es/colombia-las-falacias-detras-de-zidres-una-ley-de-
subdesarrollo-rural (retrieved 9 February 2016) 
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possible and the means to reach peace.63 The previous sections examined the 
bargaining rules applicable when foreign investors are involved, and outlined the 
agreements to resolve one of the structural causes of the armed conflict: the one 
related to land. They described the legal regime that applies to foreign investors, 
including their rights to land, and the importance of the CADP for reaching a peace 
deal in La Havana. The implementation of the latter will have serious economic 
implications both for national and transnational companies. 
 
However, the CADP does not only entail complex economic readjustments, but 
also a legal dispute for rights, duties and privileges.64 At first glance, there are 
essentially two opposing actors in a land distribution mechanism (the Land Fund, 
part of the first pillar of the CADP). On the one hand, the current landowners who 
conduct business activities to obtain profit, ranging from farming to mining. The 
latter are normally referred to as investors. This section focuses on the position of 
foreign investors who are protected by either a BIT or a FTA. On the other hand, 
there are peasant farmers who lost land because of the armed conflict, most of 
them people of limited economic resources. As part of the peace process, Colombia 
could decide to privilege the situation of the people who have been dispossessed 
— most of who were never investors — for reasons of fairness or equity. However, 
this decision could affect the interests of foreign investors and the existing 
legislation.65  
 
The constitutional mechanism to scrutinise a political decision of this nature is the 
principle of proportionality.66 The premise of this legal reasoning is that no value 
should take complete precedence over the other. On the contrary, the law should 
find a fair and reasonable balance. In the case just described, these two individual 
rights serve different values. The security of foreign investor rights is a means to 
wealth-maximisation and profit, whereas for dispossessed peasant farmers, land 
represents a way of life and material autonomy and reparations for harm done in 
the armed conflict.67 Balancing this struggle of interests and values through 
proportionality is not easy. Proportionality aims to provide equal respect to both 
values, but these values are often incommensurable and cannot be judged 
according to the same metric.68  
 
This difficulty is multiplied when one moves from an individual to a large social 
perspective. The latter does not alter the position of foreign investors who 
                                                 
63 See Duncan Kennedy, "The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!", XV Legal Studies Forum (1991), 
p. 327. 
64 Wesley Hohfeld, "Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning", 23:1 
The Yale Law Journal (1913), p. 16. 
65 We assume the good will of the state. However, many analysts have criticised President Santos’ 
ambiguous position, and suggested that when the interest of TNCs are under risk the 
afrocolombians and peasant farmer’s land rights are ignored. See 
http://www.verdadabierta.com/lucha-por-la-tierra/5936-las-contradicciones-de-santos-con-la-
restitucion (retrieved 25 August 2015).    
66 Robert Alexy,  A theory of constitutional rights (2010), pp. 101-9. 
67 See Carol Rose,  "Takings' and the Practices of Property: Property as Wealth, Property as 
'Propriety", in Carol Rose, Property and Persuasion (1994), p. 50. 
68 Gregory Alexander, Eduardo Peñalver, Joseph Singer and Laura Underkuffler, "A Statement of 
Progressive Property", 94 Cornell Law Review (2009), p. 743. 
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demand security to carry out farming and mining activities. But against these 
individual interests, there are now not only dispossessed peasant farmers, but also 
the entire society. Colombians are demanding to end the armed conflict and set 
the foundations for sustainable peace. For them, it is a question of sovereignty and 
self-determination.69 The CADP cannot be seen in this context as a measure to 
favour some individuals over others only, because it is in fact a large and mutual 
social effort to reach peace. Like in the post-colonial period, the bargaining rules 
that govern these large social negotiations can turn peace into a reachable public 
goal or a simple utopia.70 
 
b. Colombians’ right to peace 
 
In the context of the Havana negotiations, the CADP is instrumental to the ultimate 
goal of peace. Dispossessed peasant farmers have obviously more to win from a 
land redistribution. Losing their entitlements over land hinders their way of life, 
transforming them into unskilled workers in cities, if not homeless.71 This 
transformation can lead to tension, conflict and violence. To a large extent, this 
kind of tension has been fuelling the ongoing armed conflict. For this reason, 
addressing the needs of dispossessed peasant farmers is a concern for the entire 
Colombian society and, as such, the claim for land redistribution is an intrinsic 
part of the struggle for peace and a fair social order. It is difficult to envision peace 
in a country where five million people have been dispossessed of their homes or 
land.72  
 
Against this background, the CADP is a means to fulfil the right to peace. According 
to the Red Cross, peace is  
a dynamic process of cooperation among all States and peoples, cooperation 
founded on respect for freedom, independence, national sovereignty, 
equality, human rights, as well as on a fair and equitable distribution of 
resources to meet the needs of peoples.73 
The United Nations has been examining the existence of a right to peace since the 
early 1980s without reaching a substantial consensus.74 This is surprising given 
                                                 
69 John Fried, "The United Nations' Effort to Establish a Right of the Peoples to Peace", 2 Pace 
Yearbook of International Law (1990), pp. 21, 42. 
70 Antony Anghie, above n 28, p. 196. 
71 As Lehavi has noted, property rules can destroy community. Amnon Lehavi, "How Property Can 
Create, Maintain, or Destroy Community", 10:1 Theoretical Inquiries in Law  (2009), p. 43.  
72 This figure is reported by Human Rights Watch and UNHCR. The government of Colombia claims 
that dispossessed people in the country reach 3,7 million, according to figures of 2011. See 
http://www.hrw.org/es/world-report/2014/country-chapters/122015 (retrieved 24 March 
2015; http://www.acnur.org/t3/operaciones/situacion-colombia/desplazamiento-interno-en-
colombia/ (retrieved 24 March 2015).    
73 Cited in John Fried, above n 69, p. 23. 
74 Cora Weiss, "In focus: the human right to peace", IHRFG e-Newsletter, June 25, 2010. Available at 
https://www.ihrfg.org/sites/default/files/InFocus_HumanRightPeace_CoraWeiss_0.pdf (retrieved 
24 February 2015). 
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that, as one commentator has noted, ‘[s]earching for documented proof of the 
existence of a global right to peace would be unnecessary pedantry.’75  
 
A look at the debate at the United Nations shows that this lack of consensus may 
relate to the IIR, foreign investor rights and the colonial origin of this regime. The 
right to peace is intrinsically connected with the idea of self-determination and the 
respect of different cultures and communities. It is difficult to reach peace when 
people have been dispossessed of their land and their culture. During 
decolonisation, newly independent countries and their leaders hoped that 
sovereignty was going to be a means to reach peace and fairness. But some of the 
measures to reach this substantive notion of peace, such as land reforms, were 
blocked by foreign investor rights, international customary law and the IIR.76 
 
This does not mean that the IIR is against formal peace; after all, security and 
stability are necessary to carry out business as usual.77 It is rather a question of 
substance. Countries like the United States, France and the United Kingdom 
abstained from voting on the UN declaration of the right to peace because a dense 
view of peace could affect their interests.78 The issue is not the goal of formal 
peace, it is the means to obtain substantive peace along the lines defined by the 
Red Cross. 
 
As a means to reach peace, the CADP would not constitute the kind of state 
regulation that foreign investors usually challenge using investment arbitration. 
The CADP is neither a regulation nor a typical governmental measure. The CADP 
would be part of a constitutional decision in material terms. A peace deal for 
Colombia would be a part of Kelsen’s Grundnorm (or the basic norm)79 or Rawls’s 
overlapping consensus.80 In the concrete case of the Havana negotiations, any deal 
would be the result of a decision-making process involving most stakeholders, 
which, according to President Santos, would also require the approval of the 
population in a referendum. As such, the CADP would be an expression of the right 
of self-determination. The question is whether this use of the right of self-
determination requires compensation to the owners of land, including many 
foreign investors. As explained in Section 1, the 1991 Colombian Constitution 
permitted expropriations by Congress without compensation for special 
situations, but this clause was repealed in 1999.  
 
In this context, legally-acquired private property rights cannot be completely 
disregarded. But the discussion then needs to begin by distinguishing between 
those property rights that are considered invalid and illegitimate according to 
                                                 
75 John Fried, above n 69, p. 24. 
76 See Anthony Anghie, above n 28, pp. 196-244. 
77 See Occidental v Ecuador (Number 1), LCIA Case No. UN3467, Award, 1 July 2004, ¶ 183; CMS v 
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, May 12, 2005, ¶ 274; LG&E v Argentina, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, ¶ 125; Azurix v Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/12, Award, 14 July 2006, ¶ 360. 
78 John Fried, above n 69, p. 22.  
79 Hans Kelsen, Pure theory of law (1967). 
80 John Rawls, "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus", 7 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1987), p. 
1. 
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Colombian law because they are the result of forced displacement and fraud, and 
those legal property rights that need to be expropriated to reach an acceptable 
level of sustainable peace in Colombia. The first case would be the easiest because 
most investment tribunals have found that an investment —to be protected under 
a BIT or an FTA— needs to be acquired according to the laws of the host state. An 
award along these lines, nevertheless, would depend on the procedural and 
substantive legitimacy of the legal procedure that determined the illegality of the 
rights.81  
 
Where the property rights were legally acquired, and need to be expropriated to 
carry out the CADP, the question is the amount of compensation. It may be 
impossible in the context of the peace process to compensate every individual 
expectation. While it is indisputable under law that foreign investors deserve the 
same compensation than domestic investors, it is more difficult to claim that the 
former can escape their duty to contribute to peace in the same way as nationals. 
This is because the goal of the CADP is not to benefit private individuals or the 
state to the detriment of foreign investors, but to make peace possible in 
Colombia. The next section explores this problem in more detail.  
 
c. Foreign investor rights and peace in the context of the IIR: lessons for Colombia 
from elsewhere  
 
After decolonisation, the protection of foreign investor rights has been an obstacle 
for reaching substantive peace in many latitudes.82 As we will see below, some of 
these antecedents resemble Colombia’s present situation. Although some 
international lawyers have claimed in the past that states have no right to 
expropriate foreign investors, this right has always been recognised or, at least, 
tolerated.83 The problem is the obligation to pay large sums to foreign investors as 
compensations.84 The IIR does not prohibit or penalise regular expropriations. But 
it creates certain conditions for their legality: they need to be for a public purpose, 
non-discriminatory, and against the payment of the market value as 
compensation.85 
 
In the early 20th century, the Mexican Revolution promoted a large land reform to 
pacify the country and remedy historical inequalities. Colonisation had left the 
country with an unfair distribution of land as a result of conquest, plunder and 
war. Those property rights produced a situation of tension that in part triggered 
the revolution. When implementing the reform, Mexico did not ignore the existing 
                                                 
81 Nicolás Perrone, "Los Derechos de los Inversores Extranjeros sobre la Tierra según los Tratados 
de Protección de Inversiones: Una visión desde Latinoamérica" 9 Anuario Colombiano de Derecho 
Internacional (2016), pp. 273, 283-8. 
82 See David Schneiderman, "The Global Regime of Investor Rights: Return to the Standards of 
Civilised Justice?" 5:1 Transnational Legal Theory (2014), p. 60. 
83 Bin Cheng, "The Rationale of Compensation for Expropriation", 44 Transactions of the Grotius 
Society, Problems of Public and Private International Law, Transactions for the Year 1958- (1958), 
pp. 267, 291. 
84 Nicolás Perrone, above n 81, at 300-1.  
85 August Reinisch, "Legality of Expropriations,’ in A. Reinisch (ed.), Standards of investment 
protection (2008), p. 171. 
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property rights. It offered to pay what it considered was a ‘fair’ compensation. This 
attitude led to the intervention of the United States in favour of its nationals. The 
legal issue was not the right of Mexico to expropriate or redistribute land. The 
government of the United States accepted this right but demanded the payment of 
‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensations (i.e. The Hull formula).86 This 
formula required the payment of a market price, which obviously implied for 
Mexico a large obstacle to carrying out the reform.  
 
Two more recent cases are the land reform in Zimbabwe and the black 
empowerment laws in South Africa. These two cases start from a similar scenario. 
At the end of the colonial or the apartheid period, the distribution of resources 
was the result of unjust circumstances. This did not mean that every private 
owner in these countries had been involved in acts of violence, but the dominant 
patterns of distribution were the result of colonial laws and privileges.  
 
In the case of Zimbabwe, the government decided in the 1980s to end this 
situation. It expropriated large areas of land without paying any compensation, 
basing their logic on the original illegitimacy of the rights. Foreign investors took 
the case before investment tribunals, according to the IIR, and obtained favourable 
awards forcing Zimbabwe to pay market price compensations.87 The case of South 
Africa is slightly different. This country established a more sophisticated 
mechanism in the mining sector that empowered black people to acquire rights 
over mines paying a price below the market value. Foreign investors, however, 
were not being compensated for the difference between the price effectively paid 
and the market price. Some of these investors brought disputes against South 
Africa before an investment tribunal, which ended in a settlement in 2010.88 
 
There is a fourth relevant antecedent where the foreign investor has still not filed 
an investment arbitration; the case of Paraguay and the struggle for the ancestral 
land of the Sawhoyamaxa community. The state of Paraguay has an obligation to 
protect and return the ancestral land of this indigenous community. But the 
different governments of this country have resisted making the necessary 
expropriations. The main argument for not complying with this obligation was a 
BIT between Paraguay and Germany, which is applicable given that German 
nationals own part of the Sawhoyamaxa land. In 2006, however, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (ICHR) did not accept this argument, since the 
treaty in question allows Paraguay to expropriate against compensation, and 
because, in any case, a BIT needs to be consistent with the Inter-American 
Convention of Human Rights.89 Paraguay has only recently implemented this 
decision, passing the expropriation law 5194 in June 2014. Unsurprisingly, foreign 
                                                 
86 Charles Lipson, Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries (1985), pp. 79-81. 
87 Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and ors v Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No ARB/05/6 Award, 15 April 
2009. 
88 Piero Foresti v South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/01, Award, 4 August 2010. 
89 Comunidad Indígena Sawhoyamaxa v Paraguay, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, decision, 
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investors immediately challenged this measure domestically, claiming that the 
amount of compensation was inadequate.90 
 
It is unlikely that the situation in Colombia would be radically different. For the 
IIR, expropriations are possible, but there is a price to pay for peace: the market 
price of foreign investor assets. Following the reasoning of the ICHR in 
Sawhoyamaxa, Colombia would have the authority to carry out the necessary 
expropriations to implement the CADP. The problem is the compensation it may 
need to pay to foreign investors, which may amount to the full reparation of large 
farming or mining undertakings. Investment law literature and awards do not 
seem to provide Colombia with many options. The principles of balancing and 
proportionality have been applied in expropriation cases, but essentially to 
distinguish between a regulation and an expropriation.91 Tribunals tend to find 
that any measure that implies a total deprivation of the right cannot be a 
regulation, and are therefore subject to compensation.92  
 
Many developing countries claimed during the 1960s and 1970s that situations 
like the Colombian one, where the measures are an expression of the right to self-
determination, should be subject to a different standard of compensation.93 This 
view, however, has been historically resisted by developed countries — like the 
recognition of the right to peace — and it presently has little legal value in the IIR. 
 
This outcome could be criticised from the perspective of Colombians’ right to 
peace. The metric that investment tribunals would use to balance foreign investor 
rights and peace in Colombia is questionable. Investment tribunals normally rely 
on proportionality to distinguish between a regulation and an arbitrary measure. 
But peace is substantively different to a regulation and the individual interests of 
foreign investors. It would represent a keystone of the Colombian society, 
benefiting everybody, including foreign investors. This needs to be included in the 
legal reasoning, if not to exempt Colombia of the obligation to pay compensation, 
then at least to reduce substantially the amount. 
 
The argument that foreign investors should not contribute to peace — or any 
other social goal of host states — is simply unfair.94 These individuals benefit from 
the general situation in the country to make a profit, but do not want to contribute 
to it. This privilege is illegitimate and unreasonable. The IIR may be justifiable 
when host states abuse foreign investors. But any privilege beyond this situation is 
                                                 
90 Luke Peterson, "Foreign Landowners Fail in Challenge of Paraguayan Expropriation Law that 
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a positive discrimination of strong and powerful TNCs, which does nothing but 
remind us of the colonial origin of the IIR.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The right to peace is a fundamental goal of any society. Instead of pursuing a 
military victory, President Santos has engaged in a negotiated solution to the 
armed conflict with FARC. Opting for a political settlement implies an agreement 
to bringing about socio-economic transformations to structures that have been the 
sources of the armed struggle. FARC’s armed struggle is related to the unequal 
distribution of land in Colombia. In some regions of Colombia, big landowners 
have been replaced today by TNCs and foreign investors who have managed to 
acquire large portions of land. Therefore, the land distribution pillar of the CADP 
that aims at changing radically the use of land in conflict-torn regions of the 
country will necessary involve considering TNCs and foreign investors as 
stakeholders of the peace process.  
These negotiations will inevitably bring about the question of foreign investor 
rights and the IIR. The colonial past of this regime makes it an instrument for the 
protection of TNCs’ interests. The IIR could be thus an obstacle for societies 
experiencing a transition from war to peace. In the case of Colombia, it could be 
used for TNCs to demand compensations for land acquisition that could put at risk 
the implementation of the redistribution of land agreed as part of the CADP.  
The transition from war to peace opens up opportunities and brings about new 
challenges for a whole society. Multiple ‘hidden peace processes’ unfold after 
signing a peace agreement which last for many decades and usually take place in 
the sites where the idea of democratic nation states crystallise: in the 
(re)production and practice of law. In order for the IIR not to be an obstacle there 
needs to be a strong stance from the highest levels of the executive branch of the 
state to stand up for the Colombians’ right to peace and give national concerns 
priority and allow for these ‘hidden peace processes’ to flourish. 
